making in an issue area in which a subgovernment has declined is likely to be marked by a great deal of complexity and to be "much more conflictual than ever before" as a wider variety of interests become involved (Walker 1991, 40 ; See also Gais, Peterson & Walker 1984; Nordlinger 1981) . M ore over, the decline of subgovernment politics has led to more visible politics. This is primarily due to the intrusion of formerly excluded players. As Heinz and his colleagues have noted (1993, 377) , actors previously excluded from subgovernment politics-especially citizen and "externality" groupsare likely to introduce considerable instability into policy networks and to "disturb existing relationships between officials and interests." One of the important ways such groups introduce instability is by attempting "mass public mobilization" through the use of "dramatic, head-line grabbing strate gies rather than the inside strategies of negotiation" (Heinz et al. 1993, 377) .
What happens when subgovemments fall apart? It is not likely that formerly dominant players in subgovernment politics simply accept their diminishing influence. Rather, they are likely to engage in sophisticated counter-punching in hopes of neutralizing challenges to their policy dominance. But how? One way entrenched interests respond to challenges to their influence is by paying increased attention to public opinion. As Walker (1991, 192) argues: "groups that experience little conflict and enjoy close, cooperative relationships with government are unlikely to spend much time trying to influence public opinion." Ripley and Franklin (1987, chs. 1 & 5) make a similar point. Conversely, groups that experience a high level of conflict must pay close attention to public opinion.
One Response: Political Language, Causal Stories, and Symbolism
It is our contention that one manifestation of this increased attention to public opinion by formerly entrenched interests is a heightened attention to political language, causal stories, and the use of symbols. We base our thesis largely on the fact that the dissolution (or, if you prefer, evolution) of a subgovemment is, at least partially, a result of the "politicization" of the issue involved. By "politicization" we mean that an issue, or set of issues, has become openly contested. Subgovemments are characterized by issues that are either "de-politicized" or "un-politicized," which is why policy-making in subgovemments is insulated and cooperative. The insula tion of subgovemment actors provides few incentives to devote much atten tion to careful use of public language. However, the politicization-or opening of the policy area to broader public scrutiny-of issues within a policy area results in the participation of many previously excluded "players" (many of whom themselves seek to mobilize public opinion in one way or another) and thus demands that actors who wish to remain powerful pay close attention to the use of language, the construction of symbols, and the creation of causal stories about how the world works. Failure to do so can result in losing critical public debates about the course of future policy making. None of this is to say that public opinion was not important in subgovernment politics. We do not argue that entrenched actors in subgovemments never offered causal stories, attempted to manipulate political symbols, or paid close attention to political language. Rather, we contend that the dissolution of subgovemments has led to a heightened (and very substantial) attention on the part of previously insulated subgo\ ernnient actors to political language, causal stories, and political symbols. These \cr\ public strategies of influence simply are seldom if ever necessary (or less frequently necessary) during subgovernment "politics as usual."
The Decline o f the Pesticide Subgovernment
We believe that pesticide policy-making provides an ideal context in which to test our thesis. Prior to the 1980s, pesticide policy was a paradigm of the iron triangle model (Bosso 1986 ). However, challenges to the pesti cide subgovernment began to develop in the 1960s, and by the 1980s the subgovernment had ceased to exist.4 To demonstrate how much the subgov ernment had changed by the 1980s, consider Tables 1 and 2 . Table 1 contains a list of interests represented at the 1947 House Agriculture Committee hearings on the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA-the first major piece of legislation dealing with the regulation of pesticides). The table is self-explanatory and the contours of the sub government are clearly delineated.5 Table 2 To test our thesis we ask, how has one corner of the old pesticide "iron triangle"-that occupied by pesticide manufacturers and their representa tives-responded to the decline of its subgovernment? We argue that pesti cide manufacturers were not quiescent when their dominance was challenged in the 1980s. Instead, they waged a concerted campaign designed to fend off government regulation and negative public perceptions. A large part of this campaign (though certainly not the only part) involved offering new language, new symbols, and a reinvigorated causal story, to the public and to policy-makers. In short, as the politics of pesticide regulation changed, so did the political strategies of pesticide manufacturers. In a newly open policy-making environment manufacturers used language, symbolism, and a causal story to buttress their policy claims.
Given the pesticide example and the decline of subgovemment policy making, we believe that policy scholars must pay more (and more careful) attention to language, symbols, and causal stories. The politicization of policy issues leads to power struggles that are public and that are located, at least in part, in the domain of language. Those actors whose power has been threatened and/or diminished in the dissolution of the old subgovern ments must try to protect or reconstruct that power with language. 
Language, Causal Stories, and Public Policy
When issues become publicly contested the use of language and the construction of causal stories become critical. We believe that in policy disputes and debates there are three distinct discourse strategies that become important for the participants.6
The first strategy one may deploy involves framing the issue in lan guage that allows partisans in the conflict to capture the "linguistic high ground." This can be achieved by wrapping one's position in the flag or other deeply held social values, by moving from a negative articulation of one's position to a positive formulation, and/or by casting aspersions upon one's opponents. Two examples are illustrative of these approaches.
The battle for the linguistic high ground in the abortion debate illus trates the value of framing one's position in a positive manner. Opponents of abortion scored a public relations victory when they quit calling them selves "anti-abortion" forces and redubbed themselves "right to life" advo cates. They were able to show their positive agenda as well as to reframe the pro-abortionists as a negative group that is "anti-life." Proponents of abortion responded to this, however, with their own attempt to recapture the linguistic high ground-they renamed themselves "pro-choice" advocates.
And following through on the logic of their new liberty-grounded image, abortion proponents are now referring to their adversaries as "anti-choice advocates.
The best recent example of a framing contest for the linguistic high ground was the effort by many members of Congress to relabel President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as "Star Wars. " The purpose, of course, was to make SDI seem "Hollywood," remotely futuristic, and comical. The Reagan Administration, given its constant attempts to stick with SDI terminology, certainly understood the power that the "Star Wars" moniker had in undercutting the program. Regardless of the final outcome of the SDI program there can be little doubt that the opponents of SDI captured the linguistic high ground and forced the Reagan Administration into an uphill policy battle.
During and after the framing process, a second language strategy is deployed. Here, the emphasis is on renaming activities and objects so that they fit the new linguistic paradigm. In contested arenas one not only must seek the linguistic high ground, one also must rename (and recreate) the contested environment. For example, when the psychiatric profession found itself under attack in the early 1970s, it attempted to cleanse itself of its coercive and manipulative image by reframing itself as one of the "helping" professions. Within this new "helping" profession of psychiatry, both activi ties and objects were renamed. Escaping from a mental institution became "eloping," and the room designated for solitary confinement was renamed the "quiet room" (Edelman 1977, ch. 4) .
We also can see this concern for naming in the abortion debate. For pro-choice advocates, pregnancies are "terminated" and an abortion involves the "removal of a fetus." For pro-life advocates, abortion is a process in which "an unborn child" is "killed."
A third strategy to deploy in contested issue areas is to develop a per suasive causal story that will promote certain types of action (or inaction). Different causal stories will lead, of course, to different interpretations of both the causes of, and the possible solutions to, social problems (Stone 1986 ). The importance of causal stories in agenda formation and in the con test between competing policy alternatives can be illustrated with a brief example.
Social and political responses to poverty in affluent industrial societies are shaped by predominant interpretations of the causes of poverty. Causal stories that rest on individual responsibility for poverty may keep poverty off the political agenda, or may lead-as it did in the Progressive E ra -to a call for work in training camps (Haber 1973) . Causal stories that empha size the structural features of capitalism will tend to politicize poverty and lead to calls for public policy solutions or political revolution. In the United States, competition among rival causal stories about poverty remains keen, and no one version has been able to achieve hegemony.
Indeed, it may be difficult, even with the help of science, to make a causal story persuasive. The debate over public policy on cigarette smoking is a classic case in which questions of causality were central. Tobacco interests spared almost no expense to point out that statistical correlations do not prove causality. The Tobacco Institute-the public relations and lobbying arm of the tobacco industry-offered a variety of other causal stories to ex plain the correlations between smoking and lung cancer, including the claim that smokers were "risk-takers" in a wide variety of activities which might be linked to cancer (see Fritschler 1975 ). In the current policy debate over passive smoking the tobacco interests continue to contend that correlation is not causation.
In short, causal stories help shape public policy agendas and alterna tives. However, the competition among causal stories is not easily resolved. In many policy areas there is no final recourse for deciding conclusively which of the competing causal stories is (the most) accurate. Scientific evidence can add strength to causal claims, but the statistical nature of science leaves it open to legitimate criticism regarding its claims concerning causal links. Advocates of competing claims thus must rely on persuasion and persistence.
Language, Symbols, and Industry Response
Prior to the mid-1980s, pesticide manufacturers-one leg o f the old pesticide subgovemment-were not very concerned about language and symbols. Despite attempts by researchers such as Rachel Carson (1962) and Barry Commoner (1966) to politicize the issues surrounding pesticide use, there was little sustained public contest or controversy over pesticide use and regulation.7 Pesticide manufacturers, comfortable with the policy subsystem, had little reason to worry about public perceptions o f their products.
However, by the mid-1980s, pesticide manufacturers had seen their subsystem collapse and had witnessed the politicization of pesticide use.8 As Bosso (1986) documents, (and as Tables 1 and 2 show), the pesticide sub govemment-dominant during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s-lost shape in the 1980s. Pesticide manufacturers have responded to this collapse by engaging in all three of the highly public strategies discussed above. They set out to capture the linguistic high ground by reframing ideas about the purpose and role of pesticides. In addition, they used the "naming" strategy (by choosing new, less threatening names for their pesticides) to protect and enhance that high ground. And, finally, they developed a new causal story9 to protect themselves against government regulation and negative public perceptions.
It would be a mistake to conclude that prior to subgovernment dissolu tion pesticide manufacturers never had worried about public perceptions ot their products. Clearly, however, by the 1980s the policy debate over pesti cide regulation had changed. Specifically, "externality" groups had made public health concerns paramount on the policy agenda. 10 Thus, the debate over pesticide regulation is now more public, more conflictual, and broader (in that it concerns the issue of consumer protection) than ever before. The "new politics" of pesticide regulation forced pesticide manufacturers to respond.
Seeking the Linguistic High Ground: Framing and Renaming
In the pesticide arena, the renaming process began before a clear articulation of the new linguistic high ground had emerged. We examined the naming process used by pesticide manufacturers by analyzing the pro duct trade names used by some of the largest pesticide manufacturers in America. 11 The U.S. Trademark Information File (May 1990) provides information on when companies file for new product trade names and on the trade names themselves. To determine if pesticide manufacturers had altered their naming strategies over the years we examined data on filing dates and trademark names. The data indicate that, prior to the 1960s, pesticide manufacturers named pesticides after their active chemical ingredient. However, during the 1960s pesticide manufacturers increasingly began to rely on evocative names for their products. For example, Monsanto's "Lariat," "Rodeo," and "Ricochet" were three of the most popular pesticides of the 1960s. The data also show that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, companies began to use military names for their compounds. For example, American Cyanamid's "Arsenal," BASF's "Torpedo," Dow's "Bayonet," and Monsanto's "Militia" all were patented between 1977 and 1984.
In the late 1980s, pesticide manufacturers began to trademark new names that were less threatening. For example, in our coding of trade names we developed such categories as Harmony Names (e.g, Dow's "Accede," and Monsanto's "Accord"), Confidence Names (e.g., Chevron's "Superb," BASF's "Esteem" and "Confidence"), Celebration Names (e.g., Dow's "Pageant" and "Jamboree," Ciba-Geigy's Award, and Monsanto's "Hark"), Patriotic Names (e.g., BASF's "Pledge," Dow's "Justice," and Monsanto's "Anthem" and "Freedom"), Judicial Names (e.g.. Chevron's "Gavel," and Monsanto's "Jury" and "Judge"), and Green Names (e.g., Cenex's "Green Mountain," and Ciba-Geigy's "Greenpak"). We find it particularly significant that out of 99 pesticide compounds we analyzed that were patented between 1960 and 1990, 47 had names which fell into one of these six "harmony and confidence" categories; yet only one o f these 47 was patented before 1985.
To be sure, pesticide manufacturers continued to use military names throughout the 1980s. But between 1985 and 1990, only 18 o f 68 com pounds we found in the trademark file were given military names. This is in stark contrast to the number of pesticides given such names between 1980 and 1984. During this period, 13 of 21 pesticides found in the trademark file were given military names, while only one was given a harmony, confi dence, celebration, patriotic, judicial, or green name.
In short, the data show that the naming of pesticides changed in the mid-1980s. Why? We believe the answer lies in the fact that it was during the 1980s that pesticide manufacturers for the first time grew concerned that pesticide issues were becoming publicly contested. Thus, a naming strategy was employed to evoke different responses to the same basic substances. An herbicide named "Green Mountain," for example, elicits a far different vision than one named "Torpedo."
There also is evidence that during the period of subgovernment col lapse, pesticide manufacturers began attempting to frame pesticide use in a new way. In 1988, the National Agricultural Chemicals Association (NACA)-the trade association for pesticide manufacturers, which had been part of the pesticide subgovernment since the 1940s-founded a new, affiliated trade association which it named The Alliance for a Clean Rural Environment (ACRE). Note that the name itself is designed to evoke a friendlier, bucolic, and less threatening image. ACRE'S stated goal is to provide pesticide users with "the useful, graphic information they need to protect water quality and become better stewards of the environment" (NACA 1990, 5) . Since its founding, ACRE has sought to build a grassroots movement to buttress NACA's claims that agricultural chemicals are safe if properly used. By 1990, ACRE claimed more than 75,000 members who regularly receive "fact sheets" concerning everything from proper chemical use and storage, to tips for maintaining spray equipment. The material is presented in a manner designed to promote NACA's view that properly applied pesticides create no problems for the environment and that the pesticide companies are concerned environmental stewards.
ACRE works hard to reframe pesticide issues. The group has been especially concerned with the negative perception of pesticides in general, and the use of negative "cide" words-herbicide, pesticide, insecticide-in particular. Thus, in virtually all of ACRE'S (and NACA's) communications, "cide" words have been replaced by the term "crop protection chemicals. "Crop protection chemicals" (CPCs) is a less threatening term than pesti cides," and it brings out the positive attributes of such substances (i.e., they protect our food supply). This reframing of the issue allows the pesticide industry to begin debates with their opponents with the importance of pro tection already established, rather than having to begin the debate by defending themselves against the dangers (and collateral damage) ot their products.
In another interesting language strategy, pesticide manufacturers have begun referring to the application of pesticides as pesticide "management. " Applicators (managers?) are to be educated in the "best management prac tices." "Management" evokes a much more rational vision than application. Furthermore, management is seen as a science that can be taught effectively.
It is too early to tell if this renaming and reframing will be successful. The outcome of ongoing battles for linguistic high grounds is not easy to predict. However, we do wish to note that the term "CPCs" may itself be problematic, because of its similarity to the dreaded and deadly "PCBs"! Not even well-financed linguistic campaigns can anticipate the linkages that may be made when issues become publicly contested.
A Causal Story
Pesticide manufacturers have done more than simply seek to capture the linguistic high ground. They also have sought to affect the terms of debate by offering a causal story which casts them in a more favorable light. ACRE has been a key actor in shaping this new causal story. The pesticide industry and ACRE feel that there is a danger that the dominant causal story in pesti cide policy is that pesticides cause collateral damage and death. Indeed, it can be argued that the success of externality groups in offering a causal story which paints pesticides in a negative light has triggered manufacturer's heightened attention to causal stories. ACRE, in its handsome and wellorganized literature, counters this causal story by claiming that the real problem with pesticides lies not with the product, but with the misappli cation of the product. For ACRE, pesticides don't cause problems, mis application by ignorant applicators causes problems. Given this interpreta tion, public policy should concentrate on making sure that all applicators are informed of the proper uses of particular pesticides, and that certification and registration of applicators is required if "restricted use" pesticides are used.
This alternative causal story, of course, does have some merit. Misap plication of pesticides, whether through improper use or overapplication, does present dangers. ACRE has offered a causal story that places blame not on all applicators, nor even on malicious applicators, but on ignorant appli cators that need well packaged information from ACRE. In short, ACRE and the pesticide manufacturers would like to avoid the debate on the dangers of pesticides, and relocate the debate in a more sanguine arena.
Some may argue that industry's position-that pesticides are inherently safe if used properly-has not changed since the 1940s. This is true. But it is significant that only during the 1980s have pesticide manufacturers felt it necessary to sink substantial resources into publicly and consistently promoting this position. Because of subgovernment dissolution, pesticide manufacturers have had to devote more time and energy and resources into publicly defending their claims of inherent pesticide safety. Integral to this defense has been an attempt to capture the linguistic high ground and reframe the pesticide issue through the use of language.
Lesson: A New and Very Public Response
In sum, there is evidence that the collapse of the old pesticide subgovernment and the emergence of an issue network which engendered in creased and public conflict over the regulation of pesticides has resulted in pesticide manufacturers responding with a coherent symbolic and linguistic package: crop protection chemicals with names like "Virtue" and "Freedom" can be used safely if applicators are informed and properly certified and licensed.
If the pesticide arena is not unique-and we believe that it is not-and if subgovernments in other arenas face similar collapse, then policy scholars must pay closer attention to the form, as well as the substance, of policy battles. Language, symbols, and causal stories, which were not always critical in the age of the iron triangle, must now be examined much more carefully.
Conclusion
We would like to point out that there may be other explanations for the changes we describe. For example, it may be the case that pesticide manu facturers have changed their behavior (e.g., renamed pesticide compounds and ottered a new causal story) in response to changes in consumer behav ior. We regret that we cannot provide definitive evidence to support our thesis. Nonetheless, we believe that there is substantial evidence to support our basic conclusion.
We have presented evidence that one way in which previously dominant interests respond to challenges to their influence is by engaging in the three language/symbol-based strategies discussed above. We present evidence that previously dominant pesticide industry interests did not respond to the collapse o f the pesticide subgovernment quiescently. Instead, the industry created a new organization (ACRE) and began to articulate a coherent public message designed to fend off public interest groups and the threat of more extensive government regulation. The industry has begun a renaming process that protects the linguistic high ground being carved out by ACRE and that enhances the causal story ACRE promulgates about the limited dangers of pesticide use.
It is too early to assess the success o f this public approach. The outcomes o f public debates are difficult to predict, and language and symbols can be slippery. Nevertheless, given the politicization of pesticide policy, attention must be paid to language, symbols, and causal stories in this policy area. If the decline in other subgovemments also generates increased politicization o f issues, then we expect that strategies and tactics similar to the ones deployed by the pesticide industry will be widespread. This paper represents a first cut at understanding contested public battles more clearly. New conditions engender new political strategies, both for participants in policy battles and for those observing, and trying to grasp, the action. 4Ripley and Franklin (1987) (among others) note that complete subgovemment collapse rarely occurs. However, their discussion of subgovemment adaptation and collapse takes place primarily within the context of distributive policy. Pesticide regulation seems to fit into their "protective regulatory policy" category. Their discussion of regulatory policy (unfortunately) provides us few criteria by which to determine a functioning subgovemment from a disintegrated subgovemment.
Thus we are comfortable, especially noting the excellent work o f Bosso (1986) , in stating that the pesticide subgovemment had indeed collapsed by the mid-1980s.
iThe pesticide subgovemment consisted o f the USDA (the bureaucratic agency responsible for implementing pesticide policy), chemical manufacturers (represented most prominently by the National Agricultural Chemicals Association) and their farm group allies (such as the Farm Bureau), and agriculture committee members in both houses o f Congress. 6We concluded that actors use these three strategies largely on the basis o f the work o f Murray Edelman. For example, see Edelman (1971 Edelman ( , 1977 ). Edelman's emphasis is on how language and symbols are used to keep dis-empowered groups quiescent. In addition, sociological studies including Snow and Rochford (1986) , Snow and Benford (1988), and Lynxwiler (1988) use a "framing" approach which we draw upon in our discussion o f linguistic high ground and the importance o f causal stories.
7As Bosso (1986) documents, however, there were occasional "flare-ups" o f public attention. 8As Bosso (1986) documents, by the 1980s, a number o f players-including public interest groups, policy entrepreneurs in Congress, and bureaucrats from the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Dept, o f the Interior-who had previously been excluded from the process had become quite active in pesticide policy.
9It could be argued that the causal story the pesticide manufacturers offered was not "new" at all-that pesticide manufacturers had always maintained that their products were safe if used properly. This is undoubtedly true. But our main point is that during the period o f subgovemment dominance chemical manufacturers simply did not pay much attention to causal stories. Only after subgovemment collapse did pesticide manufacturers actively and very publicly deploy a causal story to defend/promote their interests.
l0See Bosso (1986) . "The pesticide manufacturers we examined were: American Cyanamid, BASF, Cenex, Chevron, Ciba-Geigy, Dow, Monsanto, Shell, and Uniroyal.
